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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
l Ir\T ALE l\f(Yl'ORS, INC.,
n L tah Corporation,
Plaintiff-A p pella11t,

~\i
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:\llj:L\TN' .J. 8AUNDERS, \VANDA
TA LBOrl1 SAPNDERS, his ~wifo, and
Tll<L\IAS .J. IVESTER,
Defendants-Respondents.

J. SA1TNDERS and vVANDA

~rr~LVIN

TALBO'l1 SA1TNDERS, his wife,
Third party plaintiffs,

Case No.
10626

- vs. C. DONIHUE and
MAY DONIHUE, his wife.
Third party defendants.

HOBI~Rrr

JE8STI~

BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'TS
l\IELVIN J. SAUNDERS, WANDA TALBOT
SA lTNDERS, his wife, and THOMAS J. IVESTER
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Re::-;pondents adopt appellants' statement of the Naturp of the Case.

DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
Respondents adopt aprwllants' statement of the Disposition in the Lower Court.
RELH~F

SOUGI-l'r ON APPEAL

Respondents are seeking affirmance of the judgmPnt
granted by the Third District Court in and for fSalt
Lake County, Utah, awarding judgment in favor of Defendants-Respondents.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree with appellants' statement of
facts which are in brief as follows.
The respondents purchased a house in Kearns, Utah,
under a Uniform Real Estate Contract from the Appellants. Respodnents traded their Equity in the Kearns
property for an Equity in a Midvale City property by
exchanging Quit-Claim Deeds ·with third party defendants
(R. 3, 4). ResrJondents later learned that third party
defendants did not in fact own any equity in the Midvale
property and had misrepresented the Midvale property
(R. 61). The appellants brought an action to recover
the back payments and for an order returning the possession of the property to them (R. 2). Respondents
accepted plaintiff demands for a return of the property
(R. 4). Thereafter appellant sought to withdraw their
demand for possession by striking that portion of the
complaint (R. 20). The respondents contested this withdrawal on the ground and for the reason that the complaint constituted an offer and that once that offer was
2

·1·<·ph•cl h:» t1H• l'Pspornl<'nt it was a binding agreement
;1Jl(l <·onstitut(•d an irn•voeahlP eleetion of remedy and
('Old<l not Ii<' withdrawn. rl'lw matter was heard before the
I lo11oralil<• StPwart l\l. IT anson ~who ruled in favor of
tl1l' n·spmHlc'nts against tlH· aPJwllants and the appellants
app1•al(•<l.
;1

I 11 t!tis adion, Appellants are plaintiff and Respond1•11ts ar<' (frfrndants and tlw parties will he referred to
Jwr< after as appdlants and n•spondents.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECIDING
THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF A REMEDY DE1\IAN DE D IN A COMPLAINT CONSTITUTES A
BINDING AGREEMENT AND AN IRREVOCABLE
ELECTION OF REMEDY.
POINT II
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED AS A MATTER
OF RIGHT TO AMEND OR STRIKE THEIR PLEADINGS AND DELETE AN INCONSISTENT THEORY
OF RECOVERY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECIDING
THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF A REMEDY DE1\IANDED IN A COMPLAINT CONSTITUTES A
BIN DING AGREEMENT AND AN IRREVOCABLE
ELECTION OF REMEDY.

[{<'spondents fail to :;:we why demand for judgment
in a eomplaint is lf~ss binding upon appellant after the
:-;1111ie has been arcepted, than an offer and acceptance
in n•gard to nny contract 1'7 C. J. S. 362.

3

If Appellant sellors had sc'nt a letter to respond(·nl
purchasers of Real Pro1wrt~- asking in the alternativfl
for a cancellation of the contract and retnrn of 1hP
possession of the property or for the re-instating of thri
contract and retention of the possession of the property
by bringing the payments to date, and respondent purchasers ans\vered accepting the eancPllation and tendered
possession to the appellant sPllers, wonld the appellant
sellers than be able to prevail upon the alternative remedy
of recovery of the back payments? Basic contract law
holds that once an off er has lwen accepted a binding
agreement is formed 17 C. J. S. 3G2. ·why should formal
pleadings be 10ss binding than any other form of communication betwePn the parties?

AppPllant argues that they did not make a valid
election of remedy in regard to the three remedies at their
disposal b~~cause
(1) They did not comply with the Utah Unlawful
Detainer Statute 78-36-3 Utah Code Annotated, and admit
that they made a mistake in their pleadings.
(2) Respondents were not in a valid position to

return possession, much less title.
( 3) Remedy must be effecatious m order to be
irrevocable, and the opposing party must be detrimentally affected in order to prevail.
Respondent will answer each point made by appellant in order of their presentation.
4

ApjH'llant ePrtainl~- dr)(>s not rn'ed to comply with
tll!' t ·nlmd'nl Ddai1wr Ntatuks to (•vict a party under
n I niforrn Heal Eastate Contract if tlw purchaser agrees
to tl1e tnmination of th<> contract and returning of the
ll(lS:~<'Ssion. rrhe eases rited by Appellant Perkins vs.
81J1·11r·1·r, 121 T:tah ·ffi8, :2-t:l P(2) -i-rn and Vcm Zyver,den
1. Fnrrnr. lf'l nah :M :Jfi/, :3!):1 P.2cl-1-Ci8, were rulings
l)f tli- s c·onrt prokrting the purchasers rights before canr·f'llat ion of a rontrad would be• entertaint>d, this court
n•r·op;nir.ing- tlwt tlie canc(•llahm of a contract could be,
and often is the harshr•st n'111edy available to the sellers.
This rl<ws not pr<>vc•nt, however, the purchaser from
\rniving tlwsr rights and accepting sellers election if
the purchaser so dusires.
The appellant should not be allowed to benefit from
its failnrt• to attPmpt to comply with the Utah Law in
reg·anl to eyiction when the same is unnecessary in order
to n'gain possession.
U) Respondents do not hold the title to the re,al

i1roperty, they merely have an equitable possessory inh·rest. The title rests with the appellant.
Tlw res11ondents had traded their interest m the
propc·rt:: under consideration to third party defendants
h.v n·ason of frandnlrnt misrepresentations made by third
party defendants. In order to return possession to appellant which tlwy had demanded it was necessary for
i·espondc>nts to make an elertion of remedy of either
enn<·Plling the fradulent agreement or affirming it.

The respond<•nts rPlying· npon appellants' eomplai 11 t
elected to cancel the agTeP11wnt and r<>gain possession
of the prnpert>· in order to turn it owr to ap1wllant.
This tlw respondPnts did. rl1 he best answer I ean think
of to appellants' argmnrnt tliat n'spondents had no right
to turn tlw possession of tlw prn1wrty over to tlt<'m is that
in acuality this is exactly what was accomplislu~d by thi~
law suit, and th0 trial judge ruled in the conclusions of
law (R. 44).
3. "That d0fendants and third party defendantR n•-

lied upon the election as mad(~ by the plaintiff
to their detriment in electing to void the contract
~with third party defendants and the Quit-Claim
Deed, and were entitled to void said l~nit-Clairn
Deed and agreement by reason of the fraud of
third party defendants ... ".

This also answers appellants argument in regard
to detrimental reliance. Surely the judge can take into
consideration the pleadings and actions of the parties
during the pendency of a lmrnuit in arriving at his Conclusions of Law. There is no testimony of an>· detrimrnt
on the part of respondents hut the pleadings spell out
a detrimental course of action taken by the r0spondent
during the course of the lawsuit that was recognized by
the judge and taken into consideration and rightly so.
(3) The next argument raised by appellant is that

under the cases of State Counseling Service, Inc., r.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 303 F(2)
527 and llfar,rtan 1!. Hidden Splendor Mining Co. 155 F.
Supp; 257, the remedy has to be efficatious in order to
constitute an election.
6

'l1 his arg-m11Pnt S<'Pllls to laek suhstance in regard
in U1<> facts of tlw pr<-sPnt case. 'Vlmt remedy, of the
tl1J'('<' nppdlants had availahlP to him, would not be con8'c1(•rPcl "efficatious all(l availing," particularly since
tlwsP are the renwclies they contract for.
\\'hat it app<>ars tlw appellant is saying is that the
n•nwrl~, of cancvllation of tlw contract and return of the
possvssion of tlw pro1wrt>' is not an efficatious or an
a.rail'ng renwd>' and therefore they cannot be hound by
an (•l<>etion of th' s r<'J;icdy. Yet this is one of the remedies
nnder thv Uniform Real ]~state Contract that has been
eorn;iclen·d tlw most efficat;ous and availing of any of
the remedivs available to the sellers. What would be
more "efficatious" than cancPllation of the contract and
the return of the possession of it.
Then' is conflict of authorities m regard to when
an election of remedies is conclusive in pleadings.
The tlrnories of election of remt>dies is well briefed
m G A.L.R. (2) 17. In a number of cases it has been
ht>ld as a general proposition that the commencement of
a suit or action is of itself a conclusive election precluding
the plaintiff from thereafter pursuing a remedy incon:-;istent with the first one chosen.
The otht>r concept as stated m 6 A.L.R. (2) 2i:$
states that the commencement of an action is not of
itsPlf conclusive.
"Ht>jecting the contention that the mere commencement of an action constitutes a conclusive election
harring the subsequent prosecution of an incon-
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s;stent renu·dy th<• Court in ,'-.,'ilfH'r 1. Uule 11~> \I<
SS() point<•d out that tlH· dodrirn• of <•l<·di()n 1>f
n·mNliPs is <>ss<•ntially lmsed upon tlw d<w! 1111 ,
of Pstoppd, and h<'fon• th1• sai11<' <·an IH• i11\'okPd
it must lw shown that tit<' a"t ion of' on<· ol' 11 1,:
pai·ti<•s has <·nns<·d th<· otl1n J 1art)· to <'lrnng·t· !ti:-:
position to his detriment."

rrh(' lTtnh Snpn·uw ( 'ourt in Cook

Core11-HallorJ
Motor Comz)((11y 2;l;~ P. 1% <'l<>arl>· puts Ftah in th<· !'ir~t
line of dPci:o-;ions holding- that the• <'OltlllH'll<'<'l:H·nt uf ,1
snit or action is of its<>lf a eondnsiv<' t>leet'on -- not
in the s<·cond as app<'llants would have this Court lwli<·w.
I'.

"The trm~ rnh' S<'<'lllS to be ( 1) that tlic·n· 111u-1
lw, in fact, t\\·o or more existing rem<c•dies uvon
\\·hi<'h the party has tlH' rigl1t to <•l1·d: ( :.!) tlw
n•11wdies thus OIJ<'n to h ·m must lw nlt<•rnatiw
and in eons· st mt: and ( :~) h<• mnst liy aetualh
hringing an action or by some other decisive act,
\\·ith knmd<•dg<' of tlw facts, indicat<· h:s cl1oic<,
lwtwe<'n these• in<'onsisfrnt rern<•<lies. 20 C. .T. 19
37, and casPs then' citc'd. "With sneh Ph'lllt>nts
present, an <'l<>etion OJH'<' clelilH:'rakly made hy
the institut;on of a snit, by which th<' n•nl<'Cl~
is song-ht to lw recoyen·d, is final, alld his failme
to secure satisfaction by means of the remedy
which Iw has adopt<'d fnrnish<'s no }pg-al rea,;rm
to permit him to n•sort to the other.
.... And this conrt has held, wlwn• th<'re is a
duty of election as to a partienlar n'medy, the
bringing of an action based upon on0 remedy
eonstitutes an irreyoeahl<' t>lt>ction, ex<'Ppt in ea~e
of mistake of fact or other legal excuse."
This case is recognized by the appellant as being thr
leading case in this jurisdiction in this an•a of tlw lmr.

'l'lw <·ns<' of [ 'tah Bond & Slwre Co. v. Chappel, 251 P.

:i;,+ is just not apvlicable to the fact situation in this

1 ·;1~<' as there was not a suit commenced in that case on an

iiwon si st en t n•medy.

l f tlw Cook ease is applied to the facts of this case

as asked in arJpellants brief then the appellant clearly
]Jad made an irrevoeahle election of n•medy when he filed
h!s complaint and one of the remedies prayed for was
aceepted by the respondents.
if the other rule as outlined in 6 A.L.R. (2)
n Wl'l'P to be followed there Was a detrimental reliance
and thereforp under Pither rule there has been an irrevocable election of n•rnedy by appellant once the alternative pleading was accepted by the respondents. This is
what the trial court found and should be affirmed in this
av1wal.
J1~ven

POINT II
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED AS A MATTER
OF RIGHT TO AMEND THEIR PLEADINGS AND
DELETE AN INCONSISTENT THEORY OF RECOVERY.

The appellant does not have an absolute right to
amend the pleadings after they have been answered.
Thr Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in Rule 15:
"Amendments. A party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of course at any time before
a responsive pleading is served, or if the pleading
is one to which no responsible pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon
the trial calendar, he may so amend at any time
within 20 days afteir it is served. Otherwise, a
9

party ma~- amend his pl<•ading onl:· h~· ]('UYt> 1Ji
court or h~- writtPn cons<•nt of tlw adv<•nw ]Hnh:
and leave shall hP fr<•<>ly givrn wh<'n justieu ,, 0
. . . . ."
reqmres
Tlw casc•s indicate t l1at tlw cldnrn i nation of wlii·H
a.pleading shall he allo\\Pd to lw alll<'nd<>d is to Jw withill
the discn•tion of tlw trial court and nnl0ss it appears tliat
this discrc•tion has lwPn ahused and the c0111pJaiuin~·
i1arty prejudicc>d therehy th<' courts rnling in allowing
or denying amendnwnts will not be allmn'd on appt>ll],
Benson v. Oregon Shoreline RaJr.oad 99 P. 107~; N c1rto 11
v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co. -±0 P(2) 204. In Bnd9er r.
Badger 254 P. 78-± the co11rt held that courts do not lo11k
with favor upon striking of ph~ading·s, and motions to
strike will be granted only in a clear case. It is quite
clear what the appellant in this case wanted to do was to
amend his pleadings by eliminating what he then considered the undesirable remedy by striking thf' remedy
from his pleadings. If then the trial court has the discretion to allow or deny tlw amendnwnt or the strikinf!'
portions of the appellants complaint and it does not
appear that he abused this discretion, then the trial court
should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
rrhere was in fact an offer made to the defendants
by the plaintiffs in their complaint to either terminate
the Uniform Real Estate Contract by returning he pos
session or in the alternative to reinstate the contract
bringing up to date the back payments. When such an
offer was made to the defendants in the complaint, the
10

Ji-f1·11da11b lwd no hPsitaney to accpet the alternative
proYdiing for tlw tennination of th<> contract and the
11 ·tnrn of' th1· possPsion of tlw property. They then pro1.1·1·d1·d to tenn·nat1• an~· agT1·1·u1Pnt tlwy might have had
11 lli third party defrndants in order to give to the
plaintiff that which tlwy desin•d. Once the offer had been
,1r·r·r•pt<·d, and tlw action tak<>n hy the defendants to com1i1~ had lwPn rnacl1•, the plaintiff should not be placed
iJ1 a position of ehang·ing their minds and be allowed to
n•1 owr und<•r an alternativp remedy. The trial court
fonnd as a mattPr of law from the pleadings and the
adion of thl' partiPs that tlw appellant had relied upon
the plaintiff pleadings to tli<·ir dt>triment and that the
plaintiff sould be bound by his election once it had been
aeeepkd. Ruhstantial justice required the pleadings
>land. 'l'lw trial court in ifa sound discretion so ruled.
TIH· trial court should not now be overruled by this Court.

1

Respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents
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